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This paper examines the impact of policies toward foreign bank
entry on commercial bank net interest margins. Do countries that
impede the entry of foreign banks induce a bigger gap between the
interest expense paid to depositors and the interest income received
from borrowers after controlling for bank-specific characteristics, mac-
roeconomic conditions, and the structure of the economy’s banking
industry? In exploring this issue, the paper provides information on
the efficiency effects of regulatory restrictions on foreign bank entry.
The paper goes farther, however, and assesses whether there is
something special about foreign banks. Regulatory restrictions on
foreign bank entry may be highly correlated with regulatory restric-
tions on domestic bank entry. If this is the case, then information on
foreign banks may simply proxy for entry restrictions in general, rather
than providing information on foreign banks in particular. To exam-
ine the independent impact of restrictions on foreign bank entry, I
simultaneously control for restrictions on domestic bank entry.
The paper also distinguishes between impediments to foreign bank
entry and the fraction of the domestic banking industry owned by for-
eign banks. Some researchers focus on the degree of foreign bank own-
ership (Clarke, Cull, and Martínez Pería, 2001). Others, however, argue
that openness to foreign banks is crucial because it makes the domestic
market contestable (Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, and Min, 1998; Claessens,
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2001). From this perspective, the key
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issue is access, not the actual fraction of the domestic banking indus-
try owned by foreign banks (Clarke, Cull, D’Amato, and Molinari,
2000; Clarke, Cull, Martínez Pería, and Sánchez, 2002). To isolate
the impact of restricting foreign bank entry from actual foreign bank
participation, I simultaneously control for the fraction of domestic
banking assets associated with foreign-owned banks.
This is the first paper to study the relationship between net inter-
est margins and the fraction of foreign entry applications denied by
the commercial bank supervisory agency when controlling for regu-
latory restrictions on domestic bank entry and foreign ownership. I
use bank-level data on 1165 banks across forty-seven countries. While
other studies examine the actual degree of foreign bank participation
(Clarke, Cull, and Martínez Pería, 2001), I simultaneously study the
rate at which countries reject applications by foreign banks. Further-
more, whereas some studies use information on the number of for-
eign banks operating in the economy to proxy for the contestability of
the market (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2001), I use
direct information on the fraction of foreign entry applications de-
nied to gauge the regulatory barriers to foreign bank entry. Finally,
other studies do not control for regulatory restrictions on domestic
bank entry; this paper, in contrast, controls for the fraction of domes-
tic entry applications that are rejected by the supervisory agency.1
I thus simultaneously examine the impact of impediments to domes-
tic bank entry, impediments to foreign bank entry, and the degree of
foreign bank ownership of the domestic banking industry on net in-
terest margins.
To assess the independent link between foreign banks and com-
mercial bank net interest margins, I control for an array of bank-
specific and country-specific characteristics. In particular, I control
for bank size, the degree to which banks hold liquid assets, the ratio
of equity to total assets, the extent to which banks earn fee income,
bank overhead expenditures, and the variability of bank profits. In
terms of country-specific variables, I control for inflation and the level
of bank concentration in each country. Results on the relationships
between interest margins and bank-specific and country-specific fac-
tors are valuable. For this paper, however, the purpose of controlling
1. For more on the impact of various supervisory and regulatory policies on
bank efficiency, see Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2002).Denying Foreign Bank Entry: Implications for Bank 273
for these factors is to identify the impact of policies toward foreign
banks on net interest margins.
The data indicate that impediments to foreign bank entry boost
bank net interest margins. Moreover, the paper finds that foreign
banks are special. When controlling for impediments to domestic bank
entry, restrictions on foreign bank entry continue to explain bank
net interest margins. Indeed, while foreign bank entry restrictions
enter significantly, domestic bank entry restrictions do not explain
bank interest margins. Furthermore, the key factor is impediments
to foreign bank entry, not foreign bank ownership per se. The actual
fraction of the domestic banking industry controlled by foreign-owned
banks does not help account for bank interest margins. The fraction
of foreign entry applications denied, however, continues to explain
bank interest margins even when controlling for the degree of for-
eign bank ownership. Contestability by foreign banks is an important
determinant of bank interest margins. In sum, the paper finds that
regulatory restrictions on foreign bank entry exert an independent
impact on bank interest margins after controlling for impediments to
domestic bank entry, the actual degree of foreign bank participation,
bank-specific factors, macroeconomic stability, and banking sector
concentration.
While the positive relationship between the fraction of foreign
bank entry applications denied and net interest margins is robust to
alterations in the conditioning information set, there may be con-
cerns with the measure of foreign bank entry restrictions. First, the
fraction of foreign entry applications rejected by the regulatory agency
may not accurately measure excessive regulatory impediments to
foreign bank entry. If foreign banks expect that a country is likely to
reject foreign bank entry applications, they may be reluctant to apply
or may use bribes and other measures prior to submitting an applica-
tion. Under these conditions, a low rejection rate will not reflect bribes
and other obstacles faced by foreign banks. Second, there may be
sound prudential reasons for rejecting foreign banks. If foreign banks
are not well managed and properly supervised in their home coun-
tries, a country may have legitimate reasons for rejecting their entry.
Thus, high rejection rates may not suggest excessive entry barriers.
These concerns, however, would bias the results against finding a
relationship between the fraction of foreign entry applications denied
and bank margins. Moreover, when I use an instrumental variables
estimator and employ different sets of instruments, I continue to find
that restricting foreign bank entry boosts net interest margins.274 Ross Levine
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1
discusses the methodology and data; section 2 presents the results;
and section 3 concludes.
1. METHODS, DATA, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
This paper examines the impact of restrictions on foreign bank
entry on net interest margins while controlling for bank-specific ef-
fects and country-specific traits. Specifically, I estimate the following
regression.
Net Interest Margini,k = α  + β 1Fi + β 2Bi,k + β 3Ci + ε i,k .
In the specification, i indexes country i and k indexes bank k, so
that Fi is a measure of restrictions on foreign bank entry in country
i; Bi,k is a vector of bank-specific characteristics for bank k in country
i; Ci is a vector of country-specific traits; and ε i,k is the residual.
The equation is primarily estimated using a generalized least
squares estimator with random effects, though I also present the fixed
effects estimates on the bank-specific variables. At the end of the
paper, I extend the analysis and use a two-stage generalized least
squares random effects estimator for this panel-data model.
1.1 Data
This paper uses two primary data sources. First, data for the bank-
specific variables are obtained from the BankScope database, which
is provided by Fitch-IBCA. The data are for commercial banks and
account for 90 percent of all banking assets. Second, data for regula-
tory restrictions on bank entry are obtained from the Barth, Caprio,
and Levine database (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2001a, 2001b, 2003).
The database is constructed from a survey of national regulatory agen-
cies. The responses to this survey regarding the denial of entry appli-
cations primarily cover the period 1997–98.
After combining the datasets, there are data on 1165 banks across
forty-seven countries. The country coverage is quite broad, ranging
from the richest countries in the world to the poorest and covering
all regions of the globe. The sample is as follows: Australia, Austria,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Burundi, Canada, Chile,
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Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia,
Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Namibia, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Ro-
mania, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan,
Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States. I conduct the analyses on
various subsets of countries to assess the robustness of the findings.
1.2 Variable Definitions
This subsection defines the variables used in the regression analy-
ses: namely, net interest margin, several bank-specific control vari-
ables, and country-specific variables.
Net Interest Margin
Net interest margin equals interest income minus interest expense
divided by interest-bearing assets. The net interest margin measure
represents the gap between what the bank pays the providers of funds
and what the bank gets from firms and other users of bank credit.
Since the net interest margin focuses on the conventional borrowing
and lending operations of the bank, I normalize by interest-bearing
assets rather than total assets. I compute and examine the net inter-
est margin over two periods. First, I average over the 1995–99 period
so that one year does not dominate. The disadvantage of this approach
is that the main explanatory variable, denial of foreign bank entry
applications, is computed primarily over the 1997–98 period. I do not
believe that this is an important disadvantage, however, because Barth,
Caprio, and Levine (2001a) and Carkovic and Levine (2002) show that
bank supervision and regulation has changed remarkably little. Sec-
ond, I examine the net interest margin computed in 1999. This allevi-
ates any concerns about the timing of the dependent and independent
variables. The disadvantage is that business-cycle phenomena and cri-
ses may unduly influence margins in 1999. In any event, the results
are the same whether using net interest margins in 1999 or averaging
over the 1995 to 1999 period. The results reported below use the net
interest margin averaged over the years 1995–99. Table 1 reports great
cross-country variability in average net interest margins. Ghana,
Burundi, and Moldova have net interest margins of greater than ten
percent. In contrast, Finland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Lux-
embourg have net interest margins of less than two percent.276 Ross Levine
Since the net interest margin is subject to measurement prob-
lems, it is crucial to use a variety of control variables and sensitivity
checks to mitigate problems with interpreting the findings. I want to
hold a sufficient amount constant to ensure that greater net interest
values reflect either operational inefficiency or market power. Con-
founding issues arise, however. For instance, banks engaging in fee-
income-generating activities may have different net interest margins
because of cross-subsidization of activities. In this case, cross-bank
differences in net interest margins may reflect differences in bank
activity, rather than differences in efficiency or competition. Also, bank
inefficiencies and market conditions may yield high overhead costs
rather than large interest margins. Furthermore, bank margins may
reflect different asset allocations and risk tastes of firms, such that
the net interest margin may reflect equity premiums. I therefore con-
trol for bank equity and bank risk; I also obtain consistent results
when controlling for bank profitability and the share of nonperforming
loans in the economy. These measurement and interpretational con-
cerns emphasize the need to control for bank-specific characteristics.
Bank-specific control variables
I use bank-specific variables as control variables, since the focus
of the paper is on assessing the impact of regulatory restrictions on
foreign banks. The following variables are considered in the analysis.
No. Standard
Variable observations Mean deviation Min Max
Interest margin 1,165 3.46 1.94 0.72 12.60
Bank size 1,165 7.14 1.98 1.94 13.49
Bank liquidity 1,165 21.38 16.41 0.23 82.19
Bank equity 1,165 8.55 6.34 –0.77 78.76
Fee income 1,165 0.89 1.44 –6.39 13.80
Bank overhead 1,165 3.00 1.77 0.15 15.72
Fraction foreign denied 47 0.13 0.28 0.00 1.00
Fraction domestic denied 47 0.21 0.31 0.00 1.00
Foreign ownership 38 0.26 0.28 0.00 0.99
Latitude 47 0.40 0.20 0.02 0.72
Table 1. Summary Statisticsa
a. The number of countries is forty-seven. The number of bank observations is 1,165. Interest margin is averaged
over the 1995–99 period. The other bank-specific variables are from 1995. Regulatory variables on fraction of
foreign and domestic entry applications denied and foreign bank ownership are from the Barth, Caprio, and
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Bank-size equals the logarithm of total bank assets in millions of
U.S. dollars in 1995. I use the 1995 figure to reduce potential simul-
taneity with net interest margins, but the results do not change when
using bank-specific control variables averaged over the 1995–99 pe-
riod. As shown in table 1, there is extraordinary cross-country varia-
tion in the average size of banks. Large banks may reduce net interest
margins if there are increasing returns to scale. Alternatively, large
banks may increase net interest margins if they exert market power.
Bank equity equals the book value of equity divided by total as-
sets in 1995. Some theories suggest that highly capitalized banks face
a lower probability of bankruptcy and hence lower funding costs. This
will produce larger net interest margins if the interest charged on
loans does not drop markedly with more highly capitalized banks.
Bank overhead equals overhead costs divided by total assets in
1995. I use this variable to control for cross-bank differences in orga-
nization and operation. Different organizations will choose different
business systems, product mixes, and asset allocations, with conse-
quently different overhead cost structures. Large overhead costs may
reflect bank inefficiencies or market power in a similar fashion to net
interest margins. I thus expect to see a very high, positive correla-
tion between bank overhead and net interest margins. Indeed, over-
head costs may be so highly correlated with net interest margin that
including bank overhead as a regressor substantively lowers the like-
lihood of finding that other variables explain net interest margin. I
obtain the same results when including or excluding bank overhead.
Fee income equals noninterest operating income divided by total
assets in 1995. Banks have different product mixes. Since banks en-
gage in different nonlending activities, these other activities may in-
fluence the pricing of loan products owing to cross-subsidization of
bank products. I therefore include fee income to control for cross-
bank differences in the products offered by banks.
Bank liquidity equals the liquid assets of the bank divided by total
assets. Some argue that banks with a high level of liquid assts will
receive lower interest income than banks with less liquid assets. This
asset allocation, however, does not necessarily reflect greater effi-
ciency. I thus control for bank liquidity in 1995.
Bank risk equals the standard deviation of the rate of return on
bank assets over the period 1995–99. Some hold that banks operating
in a relatively risky environment will tend toward an equilibrium
characterized by a high net interest margin to compensate for this
risk. Thus, to assess the independent effect of restrictions on foreign
bank entry, it is important to control for individual bank risk.278 Ross Levine
Country-specific variables
Fraction foreign denied equals the fraction of commercial banking
applications from foreign banks that are denied by the regulatory au-
thority. These are based on the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a, 2001b,
2003) survey of bank supervision and regulation. Some countries were
completely closed to the entry of foreign banks during this period, such
as Burundi, Chile, and Jamaica. Others, such as Austria, South Africa,
Canada, and Panama, had denial rates of between five and twenty per-
cent. Still others had denial rates of zero, that is, no foreign bank
applications were denied. As shown in table 1, the mean value of frac-
tion foreign denied is 0.13 with a standard deviation of 0.28.
There are problems with the fraction foreign denied variable. If a
country does not allow foreign entry, then foreign banks will not ap-
ply and there will be no applications. If a country heavily restricts
foreign entry, there may be few applications. In this case, those that
do apply may use bribes and other measures prior to issuing an appli-
cation. Denial rates may thus be low even in countries that heavily
restrict foreign entry. Similarly, measurement problems may arise
in the case of countries that allow a foreign bank to enter by purchas-
ing a domestic bank, because this mode of entry does not require the
foreign bank to apply for a commercial banking license. This type of
entry is not captured in the survey, which only measures applica-
tions. However, it is captured by the change in the fraction of foreign
bank ownership. These measurement problems should bias the re-
sults against finding a robust link between the fraction of foreign
entry applications denied and net interest margin. Nevertheless, I
use instrumental variables to mitigate the problem associated with
pure measurement error and confirm the results.
Fraction domestic denied equals the fraction of entry applications
by domestic entrepreneurs that are denied by the regulatory author-
ity. As with the fraction foreign denied, there is extensive cross-coun-
try variation. I examine fraction domestic denied primarily as a control
variable. Is fraction foreign denied associated with net interest mar-
gin beyond the fraction domestic denied? If so, it would indicate that
there is something special about restricting foreign bank entry.
Foreign ownership equals the fraction of banking system assets
held by banks that are 50 percent or more foreign owned. These data
are from the Barth, Caprio, and Levine survey. In some countries,
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Botswana, and Luxembourg. In other countries, none of the banking
system is foreign owned, as in Nigeria, India, Iceland, and Burundi. I
use foreign ownership to assess whether foreign ownership is crucial
in explaining bank margins, or whether it is the contestability of the
banking market—as proxied by fraction foreign denied—that is cru-
cial for explaining differences in net interest margin.
Inflation equals the log difference of the consumer price index
over the 1995–99 period and is taken from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators. Some work suggests that inflation will ex-
pand the wedge between interest income and interest expense. If
macroeconomic instability is also associated with restrictions on for-
eign competition, then impediments to foreign banks may reflect gen-
eral macroeconomic malaise rather than the independent influence
of restrictions on foreign banks on bank margins. I therefore control
for inflation in assessing the links between regulatory impediments
to foreign bank entry and bank margins.
Concentration equals the fraction of assets held by the three larg-
est commercial banks in each country. Banking system structure may
influence net interest margins. Indeed, regulatory restrictions on bank
entry may influence net interest margins by increasing concentra-
tion and hence the market power of banks. I am interested in exam-
ining the impact of entry restrictions on net interest margins. I am
less interested here in exploring whether restrictions on foreign bank
entry influence concentration and through concentration net inter-
est margins. Thus, I first conduct the analyses without concentration
to assess the direct impact of fraction foreign denied on net interest
margins; I then control for concentration.
1.3 Correlations
The correlations in table 2 foreshadow key elements of this paper’s
analyses. Fraction foreign denied is positively and significantly cor-
related with net interest margins. Fraction domestic denied is also
positively and significantly correlated with net interest margins. While
fraction foreign denied and fraction domestic denied are positively
correlated with each other, the correlation coefficient is only 0.50,
which indicates that regulatory restrictions on foreign and domestic
banks do not move one-for-one with each other. The correlations also
show that foreign bank ownership is not significantly correlated with
net interest margins or the denial of bank entry.280 Ross Levine
2. REGRESSION RESULTS
As a preliminary step, I ran a panel regression using both ran-
dom and fixed effects, controlling only for the bank-specific variables.
As shown in table 3, the coefficient estimates from the random and
fixed effect estimators are very close. Later regressions include coun-
try-specific variables and are run using random effects.
The coefficient estimates on the bank-specific variables suggest
the following. Unsurprisingly, banks with large overhead costs also
have large net interest margins. To the extent that large overhead
expenditures and wide margins at least partially reflect bank ineffi-
ciency, these bank characteristics will be positively related. The re-
sults indicate that big banks tend to have smaller margins. While I do
not fit a cost curve, this finding is not inconsistent with arguments of
economies of scale in banking. Equity as a fraction of bank assets is
not significantly related to net interest margins, although banks that
hold more liquid assets tend to have lower margins. This may reflect
the lower remuneration on liquid assets. Finally, table 3 demonstrates
the negative relationship between fee income and interest margins.
Banks that receive more income through non-interest-earning ac-
tivities have a smaller net interest income as a share of interest-
bearing assets than do banks with a lower portion of their income
from such activities. While by no means conclusive and also not the
focus of the analysis here, this finding is consistent with arguments
of cross-subsidization of activities within the bank.
Variable Interest Fraction foreign Fraction Foreign
margin denied domestic denied ownership
Fraction foreign denied 0.468 1
(0.0009)
47 47
Fraction domestic denied 0.385 0.5 1
(0.0075) (0.0003)
47 47 47
Foreign ownership 0.1167 0.0707 0.0795 1
(0.4852) (0.6731) (0.6351)
38 38 38 38
Table 2. Simple Cross-country Comparisonsa, b
a. P values in parentheses.
b. Number of observations in italics.Bank overhead 0.537 0.515
(0.000) (0.000)
Bank size –0.107 –0.096
(0.000) (0.000)
Bank liquidity –0.015 –0.016
(0.000) (0.000)
Bank equity 0.005 0.007
(0.319) (0.224)
Fee income –0.341 –0.344
(0.000) (0.000)
Summary statistic
R2 within 0.364 0.365
R2 between 0.558 0.522
No. observations 1,165 1,165
No. countries 47 47
Estimation Random effects Fixed effects
Table 3. Regressions Controlling Only for
Bank-specific Factorsa
Independent variable (1) (2)
a. Dependent variable is interest margins, which is averaged over the 1995–99 period. The other bank-specific
variables (bank overhead, bank size, bank liquidity, bank equity, and fee income) are measured in 1995. The
estimation is performed using generalized least squares (GLS) with random or fixed effects, as indicated. A
constant term was included, but it is not reported in the table. P values are in parentheses.
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction foreign denied 3.450 3.060
(0.000) (0.000)
Foreign ownership 0.680 0.362
(0.420) (0.639)
Fraction domestic denied 1.184 0.723
(0.114) (0.373)
Summary statistic
R2 within 0.364 0.299 0.364 0.299
R2 between 0.574 0.521 0.591 0.529
No. observations 1,165 900 1,165 900
No. countries 47 38 47 38
Table 4. Interest Margins and Restrictions on
Foreign-bank Entrya
a. Dependent variable is interest margins, which is averaged over the 1995–99 period. The regressions include
five bank-specific variables (bank overhead, bank size, bank liquidity, bank equity, and fee income) measured
in 1995 and a constant term, but these are not reported in the table. The regressions also include measures of the
fraction of foreign bank entry applications denied, domestic bank entry applications denied, and foreign bank
ownership. The estimation is performed using generalized least squares (GLS) with random effects. P values
are in parentheses.282 Ross Levine
2.1 Interest Margins and Foreign Banks
Table 4 presents regressions including all the bank-specific vari-
ables and combinations of fraction foreign denied, foreign ownership,
and fraction domestic denied. The coefficients on the bank-specific
variables are not included in the tables, though they do not vary much
from the estimates in table 3. As noted, the regressions are run using
generalized least squares with random effects.
The results indicate that greater restrictions on foreign bank entry
(as proxied by fraction foreign denied) is positively associated with
net interest margins. That is, restricting foreign bank entry boosts
the gap between interest received and income paid as a fraction of
interest-earning assets. Furthermore, the results suggest that re-
stricting foreign banks from entering is special.
The size of the coefficient is economically large. Consider the co-
efficient on the final regression in table 4 on fraction foreign denied,
which equals 3. This suggests that if Chile had the mean value of
fraction foreign denied of 0.13 instead of its value of 1, its net interest
margin on banks would be 2.7 percentage points lower (3.0.87) over
the estimation period. This would imply a reduction in Chile’s net
interest margin from 5.0 to 2.3, and it would bring Chile’s average
net interest margin below the sample mean of 3.5.
The regressions in table 4 also indicate that foreign bank owner-
ship of domestic banking assets and the fraction domestic denied are
not significantly correlated with net interest margins. Foreign own-
ership per se is not crucial, but regulatory restrictions on foreign
bank entry do affect net interest margins. These results highlight
the importance of the contestability of the market. The results are
consistent with the argument that reducing the potential entry of
foreign banks allows net interest margins to grow. Furthermore, re-
stricting the entry of domestic banks is not as critical. While restrict-
ing foreign bank entry boosts net interest margins, domestic bank
entry does not enter the regression significantly.
Finally, when including fraction foreign denied, foreign owner-
ship, and fraction domestic denied simultaneously in the net interest
margin regression, I find that only the fraction of foreign denied en-
ters significantly. Even after controlling for regulatory restrictions
on domestic bank entry and for the degree of foreign ownership of
the domestic banking industry, the results continue to indicate that
impediments to foreign bank entry boost net interest margins.Denying Foreign Bank Entry: Implications for Bank 283
Subsample of countries
Omit sub- Omit formerly
Saharan Africa socialist Omit SSA, Omit SSA,
(SSA) countries (FS) Omit USA  FS, & USA FS, & USAb
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fraction foreign denied 1.972 3.594 3.401 1.896 1.585
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.042)
Foreign ownership 0.107
(0.832)
Fraction domestic denied 0.587
(0.379)
Summary statistic
R2 within 0.371 0.405 0.368 0.434 0.344
R2 between 0.681 0.612 0.610 0.815 0.798
No. observations 1,144 1,107 930 851 600
No. countries 41 40 46 33 26
2.2 Sensitivity Analyses
Readers may have concerns over the sample of countries, which
includes transition economies, sub-Saharan African countries, and
the United States, which has thousands of banks. It is thus important
to assess whether the results in table 4 hold on subsets of countries.
Table 5 presents the results for four subsets of countries: namely,
the full sample less the sub-Saharan African countries, less the for-
merly socialist countries, less the United States, and less the sub-
Saharan African countries, the formerly socialist countries, and the
United States.
Even in the subsample that yields the smallest coefficient on frac-
tion foreign denied, the coefficient suggests an economically mean-
ingful magnitude. Specifically, the coefficient in regression 5 suggests
that if Chile had the mean value of fraction foreign denied of 0.13
instead of its value of 1, its net interest margin on banks would be
1.4 percentage points lower (1.6.0.87). This would imply a reduction
Table 5. Interest Margins and Restrictions on Foreign Bank
Entry: Subsamplesa
a. Dependent variable is interest margins, which is averaged over the 1995–99 period. The regressions include
five bank-specific variables (bank overhead, bank size, bank liquidity, bank equity, and fee income) measured
in 1995 and a constant term, but these are not reported in the table. The regressions include measures of the
fraction of foreign bank entry applications denied, domestic bank entry applications denied, and foreign bank
ownership. The estimation is performed using generalized least squares (GLS) with random effects. P values
are in parentheses.
b. In addition to the right-hand-side variables included in regression (4), regression (5) includes fraction
domestic denied and foreign ownership.284 Ross Levine
in Chile’s net interest margin from 5.0 to 3.6, and it would bring
Chile’s average net interest margin close to the sample mean of 3.5.
Thus, the robustness check using subsamples of countries confirms
the economically large impact o restricting foreign bank entry on net
interest margins.
The results in table 5 indicate that the fraction foreign denied
enters positively and significantly at the 0.01 level in various
subsamples of countries. Thus, the finding that regulatory restric-
tions on foreign bank entry boost net interest margins is robust to
alternations in the sample of countries.
It is also important to control for other country and bank charac-
teristics. For instance, macroeconomic instability may produce large
interest margins, and it may also create a political environment that
fosters a wary stance toward foreign competition. In this case, the
positive relationship between regulatory restrictions on foreign bank
entry and bank margins would reflect macroeconomic stability, not
an independent relationship between entry restrictions on foreign
banks and net interest margins. I thus control for inflation. Similarly,
bank risk and the concentration of the banking industry may influ-
ence bank net interest margins. If the regressions do not control for
these factors, then the results on entry restrictions on foreign banks
and bank margins will generate correspondingly lower confidence.
Table 6 indicates that the positive relationship between fraction
foreign denied and bank net interest margins is robust to including
inflation, the variability of the rate of return on bank assets (bank
risk), and the concentration of the banking industry for each country.
Inflation enters all of the regressions positively and significantly at
the 0.01 level. Bank risk and concentration enter some of the regres-
sions significantly at the 0.10 level. Most pertinent here, regulatory
restrictions on foreign bank entry enters all of the regression signifi-
cantly at the 0.01 level.
2.3 Robustness Check Using
Instrumental Variables
This subsection uses a two-stage generalized least squares estima-
tor to assess whether the exogenous component of the fraction of for-
eign entry applications that are denied is associated with bank net
interest margins. As discussed above, there may be problems associ-
ated with measuring restrictions on foreign bank entry. I use two dif-
ferent types of instrumental variables in conducting robustness checks.Denying Foreign Bank Entry: Implications for Bank 285
First, as argued by Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2002),
regulatory impediments on banks reflect broad national institutional
characteristics. Thus, I first use the Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-
Lobatón (2001) measure of institutional development as an instru-
ment for entry restrictions. Specifically, Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Zoido-Lobatón (2001) compile information on voice and accountabil-
ity, that is, the extent to which citizens can choose their government
and enjoy political rights, civil liberties, and an independent press;
political stability, that is, a low likelihood that the government will
be overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means; government ef-
fectiveness, that is, the quality of public service delivery, the compe-
tence of civil servants, and the absence of politicization of the civil
service; light regulatory burden, that is, a relative absence of govern-
ment controls on goods markets, government interference in the
banking system, excessive bureaucratic controls on starting new busi-
nesses, and excessive regulation of private business and international
Table 6. Interest Margins and Restrictions on
Foreign-bank Entry: Other Controls
a. Dependent variable is interest margins, which is averaged over the 1995–99 period. The regressions include
five bank-specific variables (bank overhead, bank size, bank liquidity, bank equity, and fee income) measured
in 1995 and a constant term, but these are not reported in the table. The regressions also include measures of the
fraction of foreign bank entry applications denied, domestic bank entry applications denied, and foreign bank
ownership. The estimation is performed using generalized least squares (GLS) with random effects. P values
are in parentheses.
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction foreign denied 2.09 2.035 1.902 2.317
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Foreign ownership 0.239
(0.729)
Fraction domestic denied –0.409
(0.584)
Inflation 0.118 0.121 0.115 0.119
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)





R2 within 0.365 0.365 0.365 0.300
R2 between 0.738 0.741 0.756 0.727
No. observations 1,137 1,137 1,137 872
No. countries 46 46 46 37286 Ross Levine
trade; rule of law, that is, protection of persons and property against
violence or theft, independent and effective judges, and contract en-
forcement; and freedom from graft, that is, absence of corruption or
the use of public power for private gain. These components have val-
ues between zero and two, with larger values implying better institu-
tions. I average these components into an aggregate measure of
institutional development for each country. The correlation between
this aggregate institutional index and the fraction of entry applica-
tions denied is –0.63 and is significant at the 0.05 level.
When using this aggregate institutional index as an instrumental
variable, I confirm all of the paper’s findings with little change in the
coefficient estimates. Thus, the results are robust to pure measure-
ment error. Moreover, these instrumental variable findings provide
an economically intuitive story. National institutions and attitudes
toward competition are reflected in policies, such as impediments to
foreign bank entry, and hence in bank net interest margins.
As a second robustness check, I use an alternative, arguably more
exogenous, instrumental variable: namely, the absolute value of the
latitude of the country. From an economic perspective, Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001) and Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) ar-
gue that geographical endowments influenced the formation of long-
lasting institutions that continue to shape national policies toward
international openness and competition. This argument is based on
the following building blocks. First, European colonists adopted dif-
ferent colonization strategies. At one end of the spectrum, the Euro-
peans settled and created institutions to support private property,
check the power of the state, and foster open, competitive econo-
mies. These “settler colonies” include the United States, Australia,
and New Zealand. At the other end of the spectrum, Europeans did
not aim to settle and instead sought to extract as much from the
colony as possible. In these “extractive states,” Europeans did not
create institutions to support private property rights and foster in-
ternationally open economies; rather, they established institutions
that empowered and protected the elite. Examples include Congo,
Ivory Coast, and much of Latin America. The second component of
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s theory holds that the type of colo-
nization strategy was heavily influenced by the feasibility of settle-
ment. Europeans tended to create extractive states in inhospitable
environments, whereas they tended to form settler colonies in areas
where endowments favored settlement (Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson, 2001). Third, the institutions created by European coloniz-
ers endured after independence. Settler colonies tended to produceDenying Foreign Bank Entry: Implications for Bank 287
Dependent variable
Interest Interest Fraction Interest Interest
Independent variable margin  margin  foreign denied  margin  margin
Latitude –5.180 –0.623 –2.919
(0.016) (0.009) (0.152)
Fraction foreign denied 4.550 3.638 8.324
(0.003) (0.015) (0.013)
Summary statistic
No. countries 47 47 47 47 47
R2 0.143 0.219 0.196 0.255
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
postcolonial governments that were more devoted to defending pri-
vate property rights and promoting competition than extractive colo-
nies. In contrast, since extractive colonies had already constructed
institutions for effectively extracting resources, the postcolonial elite
frequently assumed power and readily exploited the preexisting ex-
tractive institutions. I use the absolute value of latitude to proxy for
geographical endowments, albeit imperfectly. This proxy for geo-
graphical endowments is particularly problematic for noncolonies, so
I confirm all the findings for various subsamples. For more on using
latitude to proxy for geographical endowments, see Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Levine (2003) and Easterly and Levine (2003).
Table 7 presents simple, pure cross-country regressions that sug-
gest the appropriateness of using latitude as an instrumental vari-
able for regulatory restrictions on foreign bank entry. In these
regressions, net interest margin refers to the simple, unweighted
average of net interest margins across the country’s banks. The first
regression indicates that latitude significantly explains net interest
margins. The second regression confirms that fraction foreign denied
also explains net interest margins.
The third regression in table 7 indicates that latitude significantly
explains cross-country variation in regulatory restrictions on foreign
bank entry at the 0.01 significance level. Importantly, the fourth re-
gression presents regression results of net interest margin against
Table 7. Simple Cross-country Regressionsa
a. These are cross-country regressions. Interest margin is averaged over the bank in each country over the 1995–
99 period. Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of the country. Fraction foreign denied is the fraction of
foreign bank entry applications denied. OLS: ordinary least squares with robust standard errors. 2SLS: Two-
stage least squares, where latitude is used as an instrument for fraction foreign denied. P values in parentheses.288 Ross Levine
both latitude and fraction foreign denied. While fraction foreign de-
nied enters significantly, latitude does not. This is consistent with
the view that latitude explains net interest margin through its effect
on fraction foreign denied. Indeed, the last regression in table 7 uses
latitude as an instrumental variable for fraction foreign denied. It
indicates that in this pure cross-country context, the exogenous com-
ponent of fraction foreign denied is positively associated with the av-
erage value of net interest margin.
I return now to bank-level data. Table 8 presents two-stage least
squares regressions of individual net interest margins on bank-spe-
cific characteristics, various country-specific control variables, and
fraction foreign denied, where latitude is used as an instrument for
fraction foreign denied. As shown, the exogenous component of frac-
tion foreign denied enters all of the regressions positively and signifi-
cantly. Inflation also enters positively and significantly. Concentration
and bank risk, however, do not enter these two-stage generalized
least squares significantly. In sum, the finding that regulatory re-
strictions on foreign bank entry boost bank net interest margins is
robust to instrumenting for fraction foreign denied.
Table 8. Interest Margins and Restrictions on Foreign-bank
Entry: Instrumental Variablesa
a. Dependent variable is interest margins, which is averaged over the 1995–99 period. The regressions use the
absolute value of a country’s latitude as an instrument for fraction foreign denied. The regressions include five
bank-specific variables (bank overhead, bank size, bank liquidity, bank equity, and fee income) measured in 1995
and a constant term, but these are not reported in the table. The regressions also include measures of the fraction
of foreign bank entry applications denied, domestic bank entry applications denied, and foreign bank ownership.
The estimation is performed using a two-stage generalized least squares (GLS) with random effects. P values are
in parentheses.
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction foreign denied 8.287 7.047 6.958 6.969
(0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Inflation 0.081 0.083 0.079
(0.006) (0.001) (0.001)





R2 within 0.364 0.365 0.366 0.366
R2 between 0.418 0.593 0.598 0.607
No. observations 1,165 1,137 1,137 1,137
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3. CONCLUSION
This paper examined the impact of regulatory impediments to
foreign bank entry on bank net interest margins. To proxy for re-
strictions on foreign bank entry, I used the fraction of foreign bank
entry applications denied by the regulatory authority of the country.
The investigation uses data on 1165 banks across forty-seven coun-
tries and controls for numerous bank-specific and country-specific
factors.
The paper also isolated the effect of restricting foreign bank en-
try from restrictions on domestic bank entry and from foreign bank
ownership of the domestic banking industry. The paper thus exam-
ined the extent to which restricting foreign bank entry is special. To
accomplish this, I simultaneously controlled for regulatory restric-
tions on domestic entry and the fraction of domestic banking system
assets held by foreign-owned banks.
The paper concludes that impediments to foreign bank entry ex-
ert a positive impact on bank net interest margins. Furthermore, I
find that foreign banks are special. When controlling for impediments
to domestic bank entry and the extent of foreign bank ownership,
restrictions on foreign bank entry continue to explain bank net inter-
est margins. Indeed, while foreign bank entry restrictions enter sig-
nificantly, neither domestic bank entry restrictions nor foreign bank
ownership help explain bank interest margins. Contestability by for-
eign banks importantly determines bank interest margins. This
paper’s findings are confirmed when using instrumental variables to
proxy for differences in national institutions that yield different poli-
cies toward foreign banks. These instrumental variable results in-
crease confidence in the conclusion that restricting foreign bank entry
increases bank interest margins, while cautioning that this relation-
ship may reflect deeper institutional traits.290 Ross Levine
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